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Abstract
The distribution, quantiﬁcation and exposure-related effects of radiation in the
environment, arising from both natural and anthropogenic sources, is of great
(and growing) concern for global populations. Recent events at the Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Plant (FDNPP) have further highlighted the importance of
developing radiation mapping technologies that not only contribute to the
continued assessment of contamination, but can serve as an educational tool
for members of the public regarding both its behaviour and extent. With an
even greater number of people possessing smart-phone technology, a light-
weight and portable ‘connected system’ has been developed to demonstrate to
users the calibrated radioactive dose rate in an area, viewable in real-time
through a dedicated phone application. As well as allowing for system users to
be alerted where variations in dose rate are experienced, the combined results
from multiple systems are viewable through a custom-built desktop applica-
tion—permitting the output obtained via any number of units to be similarly
displayed in real-time. A successful initial trialling of the system is described
at a former tin mine in Cornwall (south-west England)—known to exhibit low,
but identiﬁable radiation anomalies in discrete areas. Additional applications
outside of its educational usage are also discussed.
Supplementary material for this article is available online
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1. Introduction
As it cannot be smelt, seen or heard, and requires specialist detection equipment to be
measured, ionising radiation has largely been viewed by the public as a highly-mysterious
phenomenon and one for which it is difﬁcult to easily understand its fundamental properties
and the hazard it presents. Whilst being essential to life and the planet upon which we exist, it
is the negative events such as the nuclear accidents at Chernobyl and Fukushima, alongside
the large-scale weapons testing of the 1960s, for which radioactivity has become synon-
ymous. In contrast, few people fully appreciate how radioactivity occurs naturally, and that
considerable doses can be encountered as part of routine activities—despite national estimates
and regulatory guidelines [1].
One of the UK’s largest mapping projects undertaken to determine the spatial extent of
naturally occurring radioactivity was performed by the British Geological Survey (BGS) as
part of the ‘Tellus South-West’ Project [2]. As part of this extensive work, an airborne
radiation survey was conducted over south-west England—a region known to exhibit ele-
vated radioactivity associated with the large-scale intrusive igneous activity, which produced
a series of regionally outcropping granite bodies [3]. The results, which are available publicly
online, show signiﬁcantly elevated (but highly localised) radioactivity across parts of the
region, all of which are naturally occurring. Many areas identiﬁed in this work, however,
detail dose rates comparable to large areas of Japan that are currently undergoing repopulation
after having been formerly contaminated by the 2011 accident at the Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Plant (FDNPP) [4].
It was following the magnitude (MW) 9.1 earthquake, 15 m tsunami and subsequent
release of vast quantities of radioactive material from Japan’s FDNPP that an increased need
to not only monitor radiation, but educate its citizens on its impact and true extent, was
identiﬁed. An additional need to undertake rapid, high-resolution radiological surveying in
the immediate aftermath of such an incident was further highlighted. Realising the absence of
any such system, the not-for-proﬁt, small (15×10×5 cm) Safecast bGeigie-nano device
(cost $1500 USD fully-assembled) [5] was developed utilising specially constructed low-cost
Geiger–Muller (GM) detector-based instruments transported by members of the public to
obtain a calibrated dose-rate map surrounding the coastal nuclear plant. Another mobile
system was subsequently developed by Ikuta et al (2012) [6], to monitor the Shimane Pre-
fecture of Japan, using a large germanium (Ge) semiconductor-type detector, transported in
the rear of a vehicle. This vehicular-based detector follows on from the earlier development of
a similar platform by Sakamoto et al (2001) [7], who suspended a NaI(Tl) detector outwards
from the rear of a vehicle in order to determine the extent of any on-road contamination.
Similar work at KURRI (Kyoto University), led to the production of the KURAMA (and
subsequent KURAMA-II) platform [8–10]. Unlike the Safecast mapping system—the
KURAMA system featured a solid-state CsI detector, with its higher counting efﬁciency as
well as the ability to yield full isotopic results from the incoming radiation. This briefcase-
sized KURAMA unit was initially designed for installation within a vehicle—but was sub-
sequently evolved for use through walking or transportation on a bike. Whilst the Safecast
system is small and highly portable, it is unable to produce an isotopic spectrum of any
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Table 1. Comparison of the features for currently available radiation detection and mapping platforms.
Safecast KURAMA I/II NaI-CBS Ge-CBS University of Bristol (*this study)
Production date 2011 2013 2001 2012 2013
Detector type GM Scintillator Scintillator Semiconductor Scintillator
Detector material Gas: Ne+halogen CsI(Tl) NaI(Tl) Ge CsI(Tl)
Detector
dimensions
5.4 cm (diameter) 1.3 cm
(height)
13×13×20 mm
(l×w×h)
5 cm spherical 8 cm (diameter) 9.2 cm
(length)
2.5×2.5×5.1 cm (l×w×h)
Minimum limit of
detection
NOT STATED 0.01 μSv/hr (137Cs) NOT STATED 5×10−5 μSv/hr (137Cs) 0.01 μSv/hr (137Cs)
System weight 0.65 kg NOT STATED NOT STATED NOT STATED 0.5 kg
System
dimensions
15×10×5 cm
(l×w×h)
35×18×20 cm
(l×w×h)
NOT STATED NOT STATED 15×12×8 cm (l×w×h)
Transport
mechanism
Personal/Vehicle Vehicle Vehicle/
Helicopter
Vehicle Personal/Vehicle/UAVb
Control
architecture
Microcontroller CompactRIOa Computer Computer Microcontroller
Reference [5] [9, 10, 24] [7] [6] —
a
a board combining a real-time controller, reconﬁgurable input-output modules (RIO), ﬁeld programmable gate array module and an ethernet expansion.
bUAV—Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.
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radiological contamination. The KURAMA system on the other hand is considerably larger,
with dimensions of 18×20×35 cm (outputting measurements recorded over the previous
3 s). A comparison of these ground-based detection and mapping options, is shown in table 1.
When compared, the system presented within this work (cost $2300 USD fully-assem-
bled—without accompanying mobile phone), however, combines the advantages of both
platforms, being both highly portable as well as fully-spectroscopic. Due to its size, the
system could be deployed via any number of carrier methods, as well as on foot. The
application of secured, Bluetooth low-energy data transmission between the detection/pro-
cessing unit and the operator’s wireless-enabled smart phone allows for centralised as well as
individual visualisation of data in real-time—important not only with respect to planned
radiological surveys, but more so as a powerful tool in educating those using the system on
various aspects of radioactivity.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Detection unit
A graphical rendering of the system electronics is shown in ﬁgure 1, consisting of the
handheld gamma-ray radiation detector and external GPS antenna, both connected to an
environmentally-sealed plastic enclosure containing the system processing, logging and
transmission electronics. These electronics consist of a main Arduino ADK microcontroller
board alongside SD-logging, Bluetooth low-energy (BLE) (RedBear Lab BLE shield) and
GPS (Adafruit Ultimate GPS breakout/MTK3339) shields—all of which are powered
through an onboard power distribution/regulation circuit, with LED indicators to conﬁrm the
system status. Whereas any number of USB-type detectors could be attached to and con-
trolled by the platform’s electronics (following modiﬁcations to the unit’s software) the
radiation detector employed in this work was a Kromek Ltd SIGMA-50 CsI(Tl) scintillator
detector, with an active detection volume of 32.8 cm3 [11].
Figure 1. Graphical representation of the system electronics alongside a SIGMA-50
radiation detector.
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As with the previously described systems (table 1), the components selected to produce
this detection and mapping unit were chosen to keep production costs as low as possible—
whilst still producing a rugged and powerful platform. As a result, the total cost of the system
is comparable to that of the other systems ($2300 USD fully-assembled). The simplistic
design of the system electronics, however, permits a variety of different radiation detectors to
be used interchangeably with the platform—following a selection through the platform’s
internal control settings.
The detector has an energy range of 50 keV–1.5MeV (across 4096 channels) with a
maximum count rate of 5000 counts per second (CPS) and an energy resolution of <7.2% full
width at half maximum at 662 keV. Photons incident onto the detector with energies greater
than the detector’s maximum (1.5MeV) are processed. However, they are placed into the
highest channel number (4096) of the detector. (N.B. Despite this recording of >1.5MeV
gamma-ray photons within the highest energy bin, less than 10−5% of the total counts were in
this channel). To calibrate each detector and assess the gain drift over time, several different
gamma-emitting radionuclides (Cs, Am, Co and Eu) were positioned in close proximity to the
detector unit (in a laboratory setting), with the channel numbers corresponding to the various
emission peaks used to derive a linear plot, and therefore determine an energy-per-channel
value. As well as undertaking this energy calibration for each SIGMA-50 detector used in this
study prior to its ﬁeld deployment, to ensure this calibration had remained constant, a
repetition was performed post-survey. From this replication, no change in the channel number
for speciﬁc photon energies was recorded for any of the detectors used. As a consequence, the
gain drift of the detector was determined to not represent a concern (N.B. Year-long usage of
the detector has shown no drift in the detector’s energy-per-channel value). However, post-
processing of the data could permit any such drift to be eliminated. Consisting of a larger
detector volume with inherently greater sensitivity than the previously used GR1 cadmium
zinc telluride (CZT) gamma-spectrometer (1×1×1 cm) [12, 13], the 25.4×25.4×
51 mm CsI(TI) crystal (ﬁgure 1) is enclosed within a 35×35×130 mm aluminium case,
approximately 1 mm in thickness. This, despite existing with a stated spatial resolution of
±3 m (as with any GPS module).
2.2. System software
Control of the detector and associated electronics is performed via software developed at the
University of Bristol. Incoming data from the gamma-spectrometer is sampled at a frequency
of 2 Hz by the microcontroller as a string of photon energies, incident onto the detector during
the preceding 0.5 s. These energies were then paired alongside the geographical location of
the unit, as determined via the systems onboard GPS module. These fully-spectroscopic and
georeferenced data were then written in real-time to an onboard micro-SD card. Owing to the
amount of data produced, alongside limitations that exist on the total volume of data capable
of being carried over a radio frequency (RF) signal, it was not possible to wirelessly transmit
full spectroscopic data. As a consequence, as well as being stored on the Arduino ADK
microcontroller as a data-array for later reconstructing a full gamma-ray spectra, only the
value for the CPS (number of detection events in the 0.5 s sampling window x2) as deter-
mined at each location point, was transmitted in near real-time (500 ms delay) via an
encrypted RF data stream back to a remote base station (a computer running additional
software developed at the University of Bristol) using an XBee (Digi International Inc.)
802.15.4 Point-to-Point RF Module. To enable the radiological intensity data to be displayed
on the accompanying smart phone wirelessly tethered to the unit, the same CPS and location
data were additionally transmitted using an encrypted BLE signal. In each instance, either or
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both wireless signals could be switched off—depending on the system’s desired usage and
operational environment. The operational lifetime of the system, however, was not adversely
affected by the transmission of both wireless (RF and BLE) signals. Whereby, through the use
of a standard 2500 mAh lithium polymer (LiPo) battery, data could be collected (and
transmitted) for a 12 h period without the need to replace the system’s battery. An indication
of the device’s battery status is provided through the phone-base application linked to
the unit.
2.3. Smart-phone application
A screenshot of the iOS application, developed for displaying the status of the device in
addition to the progress/results of the radiological survey, is shown in ﬁgure 2. To aid the
user in ensuring that the system is functioning correctly, a series of labelled status indicators
are shown at the top of the application screen—with green representing correct function, and
orange/red illustrating an error, or that the system is still preparing. Below these indicators is
a user-scrollable map, with the GPS-derived location of the unit shown as a colour-scaled
position marker (the colours of which are deﬁned by the user). At the base of the application
screen is displayed both the latitude and longitude of the system (as decimal degrees) in
addition to raw CPS value and a calibrated value for the dose rate (detailed in section 2.5)—
speciﬁc for each detector attached to the system. This calibration constant is applied within
the application settings.
Figure 2. Screenshot of the iOS application developed to display survey results on the
operator’s smart phone.
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To streamline the amount of data transmitted via either Bluetooth or RF, no spectroscopic
data are relayed wirelessly—with only a value for the total (gross) CPS being sent to either
base unit (computer or phone). In contrast to the data transmitted via traditional RF telemetry
to the main base station—which was displayed in its entirety within the software, the iOS
application, however, depicted only the most recent data point received from the accom-
panying detection unit, hence preventing large volumes of data being stored on the user’s
device. A unique position identiﬁer, shown on the top right of the map could be used to later
reference any points of interest within the main analysis software. This smart-phone visua-
lisation was selected, with the results serving as both a reference for the operator (to detail
ground that had been covered) and also as an informative tool to detail site-wide radiation
differences.
2.4. Survey site
As an initial site to test the application of multiple detection systems, the Geevor Tin Mine in
Cornwall, south-west England, was chosen. The coastal site, like many others located across
the region, ceased operations in the late twentieth century due to ever-increasing competition
from overseas imports. Identical to many other historical small-scale tin and copper mining
operations synonymous with the area, after ore extraction, subsequent processing was
undertaken on-site—with the production of considerable quantities of radiologically con-
taminated spoil, stored as extensive waste heaps. Viewed as an important cultural asset
detailing the region’s vast former industry, the Geevor site is now a popular visitor attraction.
Whereas these waste heaps have been removed and the site remodelled in the almost thirty
years since its closure, there still likely exist isolated areas where low levels of radiological
contamination are anticipated to occur.
2.5. System calibration
To ensure consistency between the different SIGMA-50 detector systems used during this
work, a series of calibrations (both in-lab or ﬁeld-based) were performed. Owing to the
cuboid shape (25.4×25.4×51 mm) of the CsI(Tl) detector crystal contained within
the SIGMA-50 unit, a quantiﬁcation of the inﬂuence of its orientation was undertaken. The
results of exposing three identical detectors to different radiation ﬁelds (intensity and
orientation from front face) are shown in ﬁgure S1 and is available online at stacks.iop.org/
JRP/38/329/mmedia. Apparent is the considerable CPS variation experienced with differ-
ences in its orientation—as a result, a consistent positioning of the device—with the system’s
long-axis parallel to the ground, which was used to attain maximum system sensitivity at only
a marginal degradation to the crystal’s stopping power [14].
In contrast to the formerly used CZT composition Kromek GR1 gamma-ray spectro-
meter, where an exponential (logarithmic) decrease in detector efﬁciency with increasing
photon energy was determined [15] (reducing to 0.005% detection efﬁciency at 1500 keV),
the CsI-based SIGMA-50 is characterised by an improved detector efﬁciency at higher
incident photon energies (0.2% detection efﬁciency at 1500 keV) [16]. Through applying the
approximately linear reduction in detection efﬁciency that is derived (when graphed onto a
log-linear scaling), a compensation for this energy dependence/efﬁciency of the detector, can
be accounted for. This correction is performed digitally on either the mobile phone or base-
station platform, whereby the mathematically derived function describing the trend is applied
to correct for such detector inefﬁciencies.
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After applying this correction to the SIMGA-50 derived CPS data to correct for such an
intrinsic inefﬁciency, a calibration to permit the conversion from CPS to a meaningful value
of dose rate (μSv/hr) was undertaken—the results of which are shown in ﬁgure S2 (plotted
from all three units). Also performed within the laboratory, a calibrated RADEX dosimeter
was additionally exposed to the same incident radiation ﬁelds as described previously for the
orientation calibration presented in ﬁgure S1. A strongly linear relationship between both
units was observed from this comparison.
An additional inter-system comparison was undertaken within the ﬁeld to analyse the
impact of differences in orientation (survey direction) at which ground-based monitoring is
undertaken, as well as the inﬂuence of human (bodily) attenuation upon the results. As has
been quantiﬁed in earlier studies [17, 18], a reduction in the maximum recorded intensity of
between 20% and 30% has been attributed to the radiation shielding imposed by human
interception and absorption of gamma-rays. Using a location at the site known to exhibit
elevated levels of radioactivity, three different operators were asked to walk around this point
as if conducting a routine survey—following a closely-spaced (0.5 m grid separation) raster
path-line around the radioactive source. A plot detailing the radiation intensity (as CPS)
against the GPS-derived distance from that point is shown in ﬁgure S3. A linear decline in
radiation intensity is observed. Whilst an inverse-square (1/distance2) relationship would be
typical of such a scenario, the small emitter-detector distances associated with these mea-
surements, combined with the non-point geometry of the source utilised, therefore provide
mechanisms to account for such a relationship. A degree of variation, amounting to a dif-
ference of up to 31% (average=23%), is seen at speciﬁc distances from the source (viewed
as the vertical spread of data)—which is consistent within the typical reductions in intensity
deﬁned by the earlier works, due to the interception and absorption of gamma-rays by a
human surveyor.
An accuracy assessment of the Adafruit Ultimate GPS module used in this work com-
prised the ﬁnal portion of the pre-survey system calibration. To undertake this assessment, the
position of a series of locations across the site was determined using a Leica GNSS dGPS
unit, with the same geospatial positions subsequently determined using the Adafruit Ultimate
GPS module. The results of this inter-system calibration exercise are shown in ﬁgure S4. A
mean offset between both units of ±0.43 m was determined from this study, hence, sub-metre
spatial resolution of the system was attainable.
3. Results
With the primary goal of this work being to develop an integrated platform for radiation
mapping that also allowed for the simultaneous education of its users to potential radiological
hazards—the complete radiation map of the site, as determined through the application of three
simultaneously operated units, is shown in ﬁgure 3. An accompanying Ordnance Survey map
detailing the dose rates at many positions across the site for inter-system comparison/
calibration of results is shown in ﬁgure 4, determined using the RADEX handheld survey
meter. Despite elevated, yet highly-isolated levels of contamination existing at portions of the
Geevor Site (shown in red); the levels of radiation are low—as would be expected for a mining
site that has undergone extensive site-wide remedial activity. The average dose rate recorded by
the system across the entire site during this work was 0.35 μSv/hr, marginally higher than the
UK average background rate of 0.31μSv/hr, yet more than half the 0.79μSv/hr average
radiation exposure received by those residing within Cornwall (mostly due to radon gas
exposure) [1].
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Owing to the real-time feedback to the operator’s tethered iOS mobile device, a high
level of ground coverage attainable by each of the detection and mapping systems is
observed. Depicted within the results is; (a) the units together covering a large area of the
Geevor site in 6 h, but most-signiﬁcantly, (b) evaluating this through a series of tightly-spaced
Figure 3. 3D post-processed rendering of the radiation mapping survey at the Geevor
Site, showing; (a) full site area, (b) locality (i), and (c) localities (ii to iv). Each of the
four locations is associated with former operations at the site.
Figure 4. Dose-rate measurements obtained at distributed locations around the site,
obtained using the RADEX handheld dosimeter. The positions ((i) to (iv)) represent the
same locations as indentiﬁed in ﬁgure 3 and the gamma-ray spectra shown in ﬁgure S5
(base map © Ordnance Survey 2016).
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survey grids. This, combined with the rapid readout rate of the system, permits sub-metre
coverage and removes the requirement to perform inter-point smoothing and inﬁlling that
would otherwise be required between widely-spaced data points—hence degrading the ulti-
mate spatial resolution attainable.
Observed within the radiation map of the entire site presented in ﬁgure 3(a), and as
expected given the location and nature of works on the site, is the prominent area of elevated
dose rates across the central, downwards sloping portion of the site—the location of the site’s
former mining and processing operations. The areas bordering this portion of the site all
exhibit uniform, low levels of radioactivity with dose rates of 0.15–0.29 μSv/hr (typical of a
low UK background level). Unlike these low dose-rate areas (found at level and slightly
elevated positions to the west and east of the primary southwards trending contamination
‘plume’), the central band of elevated radioactivity is associated with the exposure of bare
ground, where there was no considerable thickness of grass, bracken and soil—having been
stripped away during earlier remedial operations. Not only do soil and vegetation layers
provide a blanketing means of attenuating the emission of gamma-rays from the underlying
rock strata, they provide a binding and stabilising effect on any sloped ground. Based on the
recorded data, the stability of the bare slopes is inferred to have been reduced and hence the
radiological data imply that a downslope migration of mineral-derived radiological con-
tamination has occurred.
One of the highest observed radiation levels at the site, identiﬁed as position (i) in
ﬁgure 3(b), is not associated with the central site operations or even a building on the site—
located, however, 400 m to its north-west. This ﬂat 50 × 50 m area consisted of a former spoil
heap that has since been levelled, with the region constituted by a thick red mud following
bulk material removal and land reshaping. It is highly likely also, that material deposited at
this locality was sourced additionally from the neighbouring Levant Mine—a site similarly
extracting copper and tin during the nineteenth century. A dose rate measured for this locale is
50% greater than the site-wide average for the entire Geevor site, at 0.50 μSv/hr. This
location is distinct from the other ‘hot-spots’ of elevated activity recorded at the Geevor site,
owing to its large lateral extent—rather than being highly localised.
As expected, elevated yet highly localised (metre-scale) regions of radioactivity are
associated with positions on the site where both mining and the subsequent processing of the
extracted (ore and gangue) material occurred. Identiﬁed as points (ii), (iii) and (iv) on
ﬁgure 3(c), located within the sloping area of the general elevated radioactivity formerly
described (and shown graphically in ﬁgure 3(a)), are three distinct points. The northern-most
of these three sub-localities is the largest in its extent as well as showing the greatest activity
of the entire Geevor site. At approximately 50 m in extent and with dose rates of 0.72 μSv/hr,
the activity from position (ii), as with (i) further to the north, is witnessed to also originate
from a region of un-remediated land—left as a legacy tip from former operations. A portion of
this contamination is also associated with the corner of a neighbouring building that now
houses the gold-panning exhibition—with a large collection of original wooden settling tables
used to separate the valuable ore from the associated gangue species.
Thirty-ﬁve metres south-south-east of this large and higher-activity anomaly exists
location (iii) (ﬁgure 3(c)). Not as spatially extensive or as radiologically active as locality (ii),
the position of this ‘hot-spot’ occurs at the location of a number of large granitic boulders—
forming part of an exhibition outside the museums entrance. This region of enhanced activity
is the most spatially limited of all the localities, at less than 5 m in extent. Whilst minimal in
size—of note, however, is the dose rate that this entirely natural material exhibits—at
0.50 μSv/hr, identical to (i)—where spoil generated from this material was deposited across a
considerable area of the site.
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The ﬁnal point showing elevated activity above the general background, located 50 m
south-east of locality (iii), is the anomaly marked as (iv) in ﬁgure 3(c). Of all the four points
identiﬁed through this high-resolution gamma-spectrometry survey, this body displays the
lowest recorded dose rate at only 0.46 μSv/hr; only marginally above the site-wide back-
ground level. As with the other localities (i), (ii) and (iii) before it, this locality represents the
location of former activities on the site—in this instance the mine’s main ‘Victory Shaft’
tower and the neighbouring museum reception building, where assorted scrap metal (formerly
part of the mine’s construction) is located.
When the results derived using this newly developed mobile survey platform are directly
compared with the numerous point measurements collected over the same area via the
handheld RADEX unit, a high level of consistency between the measurements is observed.
As can be seen in ﬁgure 4, not only is the location of these anomalies identiﬁed, but the
magnitude of the activity (dose rate), alongside the spatial extent of the contamination. Owing
to the way the data are acquired during the survey (as a series of calibrated channel energies)
and subsequently stored—a gamma-ray spectrum can be derived from the results—permitting
the forensic attribution of speciﬁc radionuclides to the contamination. The gamma-ray spectra
acquired at the four anomaly sites (i to iv) in ﬁgures 3(b) and (c) are shown in ﬁgure S5. As
expected for a series of spectra derived from a common uranium-ore source, the recorded
emission peaks are identical and result from the radioactive decay of the gamma-emitting
daughter products that have subsequently ingrown since the minerals were emplaced into the
country rock—with the peaks identiﬁed in ﬁgure S5 occurring from the radioactive decay of
214Bi and 214Pb. A close similarity in the relative intensities (detector efﬁciency corrected) of
the contributing peaks (±4%) between each of the spectra implies; (a) a commonality to the
source material and (b) secular equilibrium in the radioactive ore minerals—hence suggesting
that neither preferential transport, nor biological uptake, has occurred.
4. Discussion
Over a total of 18 man hours, 70 000 m of survey length was mapped with the results from the
three mobile units viewed in real-time by both the system’s on-the-ground operator as well as
remotely, via a secure RF transmission of the data. From each of the mapping units, a number
of regions showing elevated activity levels were observed. However, whilst the recorded
intensity was notably greater than the land that surrounds them—each of these anomalies
represents a dose rate that is well below background radiation levels typical of Cornwall as
well as being highly localised in their spatial extent—some of which are sub-metre in size.
The ability of the on-the-ground operator to see in real-time the subtle variations in
radioactivity means that surveys can be conducted more intuitively, with greater amounts of
time, ground coverage and scrutiny dedicated to ‘interest’ areas. The real-time identiﬁcation
of discreet ‘hot-spots’ during the survey presented here, enabled the survey teams to return to
these locations during the period of the survey to collect ﬁxed point gamma-ray spectra,
where photon counting was conducted for discrete (10–20 min) periods.
In addition to its use in routine monitoring, the platform also has the potential to be
adopted as one of the toolkit technologies that would be required in response to a nuclear
emergency. It is well documented that after the FDNPP accident, there was a lack of detailed
knowledge for up to 2 weeks, as to the spread and intensity of ground-deposited radiation
[19, 20]. This lack of knowledge led to initial decisions regarding evacuation of civilian
populations in the nearby area to be overly risk averse, resulting in the forced relocation of
some 162 700 people. The results of a recent statistical ‘J-value’ study by Thomas et al [21]
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has indicated that under the Japanese Government’s 20 mSv yr−1 safe-return criterion, it was
not advisable to relocate any of the 162 700 people that inhabited the nearby towns and
villages. This is because the inhabitants’ calculated gain in life expectancy, even in the most
contaminated settlements, would have been insufﬁcient to balance the fall in their life quality
index caused by their notional ‘payment’ of the costs of relocation (ﬁnancial, physical and
mental).
If a technology to rapidly determine the spread and intensity of the radiation had been
available at the time of the Fukushima event, then perhaps different decisions would have
been made about evacuation. Certainly, there is a well-stated requirement for the nuclear
industry to improve the emergency response capability for any future nuclear emergen-
cies [22, 23].
The systems presented here, have demonstrated the capability to rapidly record high
sensitivity, metre-resolution data that is transmitted (securely) in real-time to a central (off-
site) location. Not only does this enable the on-the-ground operators to understand their
personal risk, but enables strategic decision makers (emergency response co-ordinators),
working from a protected centralised location, to achieve a rapid analysis and assessment of
the developing situation and thereby aid critical decisions to manage the situation.
Finally, when presenting radiation data to a scientiﬁc audience, it is wholly acceptable to
use SI units of radiation dose and to expect an implicit understanding of the true risks posed
by radiation, based on the intensity of the exposure. An equally implicit understanding is that
radiation is ubiquitous.
5. Conclusions and future work
With real-time feedback combined with the operator’s natural curiosity and desire to identify
areas with the greatest radioactivity within an area, the application-based radiation mapping
platform developed in this work has enabled a methodical survey of the former Geevor Tin
Mine to be undertaken, with metre-scale areas of elevated radioactivity identiﬁed and spec-
trally characterised.
Whilst only one RADEX dosimeter was used opposed to the three of the newly-devised
mobile phone-tethered radiation logging units, as can be seen from the volume of data
collected from across the site, the fully autonomous collection of data by this new system
permits 100s of times the data to be acquired over the same collection period (sampling data
every 0.5 s). In addition to geospatially guiding operatives during surveys, the simplistic
front-facing phone application allows for untrained personnel with no technical knowledge to
use the platform whilst rapidly recording meaningful data. In addition to the initial usage of
the system described here, however, the platform also has the potential to be deployed as part
of an emergency response scenario—where results are required to be rapidly (and securely)
transmitted to a central system to enable rapid analysis and an associated response.
Although already highly visual, and a powerful means with which to visualise zones of
elevated radioactivity with respect to naturally occurring background levels, a number of
improvements and enhancements to the system are planned. These modiﬁcations include:
• A graphical representation of dose rate (in addition to units of μSv/hr) to permit a
layman’s visualisation of radiation levels. This is proposed to take the form of an average
hourly dose rate—with other possible correlations presented to everyday radiological
exposures, such as proportions of a chest x-ray or hours spent on a transatlantic ﬂight.
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• Addition of a ‘simpliﬁed’ menu screen—displaying only limited information. Such a
screen would remove the map, comprising the system’s nine status indicators and data
readouts.
• Streamlining of the data readout from the system, thereby giving the application’s user the
option (if desired) to view a fully-labelled gamma-ray spectrum of the incident radiation.
• The ability to use alternate base maps within the application, other than current OS plots.
These could include both current and past satellite imagery maps as well as historical
site maps.
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